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1 Introduction  
The multinational enterprise (MNE) is on the rise; in the last 30 years the share of global corporate 
profits accruing to non-residents has more than tripled (Tørsløv et al. 2018). This development 
has opened up a new avenue of tax avoidance where firms artificially move taxable profits to tax 
havens (commonly referred to as ‘profit shifting’). High-profile ‘leaks’ have documented how this 
type of tax planning is eroding the tax payments of some of the world’s largest companies.1 Across 
the world, governments, international institutions, and the general population express concern 
about the sustainability of corporate tax.2 
Firms come in very different sizes. Globally, the largest 0.001 per cent of firms earn roughly one-
third of all corporate profits.3 Hence, understanding the behaviour of the largest firms is key if one 
seeks to examine the overall scale of profit shifting. In the public and political debate it is often 
assumed that the firms shifting the most profits are also the largest.4 Nonetheless, there is little 
systematic evidence of how profit shifting differs across firm size. In this paper, we investigate the 
link between firm size and profit shifting. We find that the bulk of profit shifting occurs at the 
very top, while the majority of firms shift little or no profits. As the largest firms have the most 
profits to shift, failing to account for increased profit shifting at the top will lead to dramatically 
underestimated tax losses. 
Inequality in profit shifting across firms has important implications for both policy and research. 
First, whereas previous research has focused on tax losses, this paper highlights another potential 
welfare implication of profit shifting. A concentrated tax benefit given to a few large firms distorts 
competition and as a result may create an efficiency loss.5 Second, as we show in this paper, failing 
to account for heterogeneities in profit shifting across firms will severely underestimate the tax 
loss caused by profit shifting. That is, when aggregating the profits shifted by firms, one must take 
into account that the firms with the largest profits shift the most profits. This insight is not only 
relevant when estimating overall tax losses, but essential when evaluating policies that aim to limit 
profit shifting. As the bulk of profit shifting occurs at the top of the size distribution, anti-shifting 
policies should mainly be evaluated at the top as well. Finally, from an ethical perspective, it may 
simply seem less ‘fair’ that few firms obtain the tax benefits of tax havens while most do not.  
As important as profit shifting may be in developed countries, the current hypothesis is that the 
issue is even more relevant in developing countries. This is because of the dire outcome of any 
additional tax loss in countries that are already severely financially constrained. Additionally, 
capacity-constrained tax authorities in these countries will be underequipped to deal with complex 
                                                 
1 Most recently, the Paradise Papers revealed the tax planning strategies of Apple, Google, Nike, and Facebook. 
Outside of the Western hemisphere, Glencore, SAB Miller, and Barclays are the companies that have caused public 
outcry in Africa. 
2 See e.g. UNCTAD (2015), IMF (2016), and OECD (2015c). 
3 From a simple back-of-an-envelope calculation: Forbes report that the largest 2,000 companies earned US$3.3 trillion 
in 2015. In the same year, Tørsløv et al. (2018) estimate global profits were US$11.5 trillion. Finally, ORBIS have 
managed to identify 200 million companies globally. 
4 See for example Jones (2015b) or Boffey (2017). 
5 In fact, the argument of unfair competition is what drives recent legal procedures in the EU involving Apple, 
Starbucks, Fiat, and IKEA (Boffey 2017). Johannesen (2012) shows theoretically how these distortions lead to the 
existence of firms that, from a welfare perspective, should have been crowded out. 
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multinational tax planning.6 However, lack of credible empirical evidence has led to stern debate 
on the actual size of the issue in developing countries (Forstater 2015; Johannesen and Pirttilä 
2016). In this paper, we gain access to the universe of South African corporate tax returns, which 
enable us to observe foreign-owned firms operating in South Africa. While using tax-
administrative data to estimate profit shifting is best practice, only Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
and the United States have granted researchers access to tax return information on MNEs.7 Profit-
shifting estimates outside of these countries rely on macro data or proprietary micro datasets with 
issues of sample selection and missing information on tax credits (OECD 2015a; Tørsløv et al. 
2018). This is the first study to exploit a tax administrative dataset to estimate profit shifting in a 
developing-country setting. 
To estimate profit shifting we employ the standard approach by relating economic activity (such 
as wage bill and assets) to taxable profits (from which taxes are paid). If a firm reports low taxable 
profits while economic activity is high, this is a first indication of profit shifting.8 Low profitability 
could also be the result of poor management or types of tax avoidance other than profit shifting. 
However, if firms with an affiliation to tax havens have systematically lower profitability relative 
to firms with no haven relation (within the same industry and with similar production inputs), this 
is taken as indirect evidence of profit shifting. Previous micro studies estimate profit shifting by 
estimating this profitability gap in an unweighted regression analysis.9 This procedure yields an 
estimate of average profit shifting across firms but puts equal weight on firms with large and small 
profits. However, since the key policy parameter is not average but total profit shifting, it is important 
to weigh the profit shifting of each firm by its taxable profits.  
Not accounting for size implies that profit shifting gets underestimated. The reason is that larger 
firms shift more and have higher taxable profits to shift. To show this, we begin by following prior 
research and estimate the unweighted average effect of a tax haven affiliation. In the South African 
case, we find that, conditional on production inputs and within industry, the average firm with a 
parent in a tax haven reports 34 per cent less taxable income than the average foreign-owned firm 
with no parent in a tax haven. Following the above-mentioned logic, the immediate conclusion is 
that 34 per cent of tax payments from these firms are lost. However, this analysis hides the fact 
that for the smallest 50 per cent of firms there is no estimated tax loss, that is, no response to a 
tax haven connection. On the contrary, the estimated tax loss resulting from a tax haven 
connection is 78 per cent in the largest 10 per cent of firms (see Figure 1a). As the largest 10 per 
cent of firms account for the bulk of the tax base, we show that the total tax loss is underestimated 
by more than 80 per cent when not accounting for these differences across firm size. The 
combination of high profits and more aggressive profit shifting implies that the largest 10 per cent 
of foreign-owned firms account for 98 per cent of all profits shifted to tax havens (see Figure 1b). 
Inequalities in profit shifting transcend South Africa. In the micro database that is most used for 
profit shifting studies (ORBIS), the largest 2 per cent of firms (measured according to wage bill) 
                                                 
6 As noted by the OECD in their G20-mandated report on base erosion and profit shifting: ‘developing countries face 
difficulties in building the capacity needed to implement highly complex rules and to challenge well-advised and 
experienced MNEs’ (OECD 2014). 
7 OECD (2015a: 32–37) discuss the lack of tax return usage and identify the databases in the United States, Germany, 
and Sweden. In addition, a recent working paper by Hopland et al. (2018) gains (partial) access to Norwegian MNE 
tax returns. 
8 The seminal work by Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) introduced this methodology using macro 
data and it has since become its own strand of research. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) and Dharmapala (2014) 
give an overview of the later literature, which predominantly relies on micro studies. See also de Mooij and Ederveen 
(2008).   
9 The unweighted regression analysis (which allows all firms to have the same weight) is applied in all of the plus-thirty 
micro studies referenced in Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) and Dharmapala (2014). To our knowledge, no micro 
studies of profit shifting at the firm level have used a weighted regression analysis. 
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earn 45 per cent of all profits. We revisit OECD’s official Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
estimate (Johansson et al. 2017), which exploits the ORBIS micro database in an unweighted 
regression analysis and find that profit shifting might be underestimated by as much as 40 per cent. 
The empirical concerns of not accounting for size stretch further than the dollar amounts lost. 
ORBIS only covers 17 per cent of all subsidiaries (Tørsløv et al. 2018)—if the composition of the 
subsidiaries not covered is related to firm size, this will have implications for the micro results.10  
These findings can help to explain the notable gap between micro and macro estimates of profit 
shifting. The most cited recent micro studies estimate average tax losses of less than 2 per cent of 
corporate tax revenues (Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Dharmapala and Riedel 2013) and no more 
than 4 per cent (Johansson et al. 2017).11 On the contrary, macro studies find tax losses of 8–25 
per cent of corporate tax revenues.12 This has led to the puzzle of a micro/macro gap in profit-
shifting estimates (see e.g. Beer et al. 2018). There is of course a clear way to reconcile these 
differing conclusions: a few very large firms avoid a lot of taxes, while a lot of small firms do not 
avoid taxes at all. To examine this further, we add up the South African tax returns of foreign-
owned subsidiaries to replicate past macro findings. Consistent with past macro estimates, we find 
that that profitability is 80 per cent lower in firms with a tax haven affiliation. Using the micro 
data, we can then calculate the contribution of each firm to the macro estimate of artificially shifted 
profits. Remarkably, we find that the macro estimate is driven by very few firms—10 firms drive 
50 per cent of the aggregate profitability gap.   
                                                 
10 Concerns about coverage and other shortcomings of the ORBIS database are well explained in the OECD (2015a) 
report that estimated the global revenue loss arising from BEPS. According to the OECD (2015a), the ORBIS 
database ‘is based upon financial account rather than tax return data. With respect to its representativeness for the 
purposes of BEPS empirical analysis, Cobham and Loretz (2014) note the Eurocentric nature of the sample and its 
weakness in coverage of low-income’. See OECD (2015a: chapter 1) for a discussion. 
11 Beer et al. (2018) do a meta study using past micro evidence and reach a ‘consensus’ estimate of a tax loss of 2.7 per 
cent of corporate tax receipts. 
12 See Clausing (2016), Crivelli et al. (2015), Hines and Rice (1994), Tørsløv et al. (2018), UNCTAD (2015), and 
Zucman (2014). 
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Figure 1: Profit shifting across firm size 
Figure 1a: Impact of tax haven affiliation on profitability 
 
Figure 1b: Share of total estimated tax loss  
 
 
Note: Figure 1a shows the differential impact of having a parent in a tax haven. Size deciles are constructed 
using wage bill; 0–10% being the smallest 10% of firms and 90–100% being the largest 10%. The OLS model 
log(πit) =β1 log(Kit) +β2 log( Lit )+β3Parent in haveni+αnt+ϵi is estimated within deciles and β3 plotted. An empty 
marker indicates statistical insignificance. The blue line shows the unweighted average estimate of β
3
. Figure 1b 
uses the coefficients from Figure 1a to estimate the tax loss of each decile and then reports each decile’s share 
of the total estimated tax loss. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
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To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature in two unique ways. First, it documents 
inequalities in the tax planning of multinationals and the importance of these inequalities for our 
understanding of profit shifting. Second, it is the first study to exploit actual tax returns in a 
developing country to examine the issue of international tax planning.  
The paper will continue as follows: in Section 2, we briefly explain the South African context. In 
Section 3, we elaborate on the tax administrative data source used in this paper. In Section 4, we 
briefly motivate why size may be a factor when firms decide how much profit to shift. In Section 
5, we present a simple visual analysis of the striking patterns in taxable income across firms. In 
Section 6, we move to a simple profitability analysis that allows us to look at firm-level 
contributions to past macro estimates of profit shifting, before turning to a regression analysis of 
the heterogeneity of profit shifting across firm size in Section 7. Finally, we show how the OECD 
BEPS estimate changes when accounting for firm size and discuss the overall findings of the paper 
in Sections 8 and 9. 
2 South African context  
South Africa is an upper-middle-income emerging economy with a population of 56 million and a 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$5,274 in 2016 (World Bank 2016). As Africa’s 
second largest economy (after Nigeria) and as a BRICS member, South Africa is seen by many as 
its region’s leader. This has also been the case in international taxation, where South Africa is an 
active part of the OECD’s work on BEPS.  
In many ways, the South African macroeconomic statistics exemplify the common developing-
country situation. Firstly, as with most developing countries,13 South Africa is fiscally constrained. 
Tax revenue was 26 per cent of GDP in 2015–16, which is less than the OECD average of 34 per 
cent.14 Historically, a substantial portion of tax revenue in developing countries has been collected 
from corporations, particularly large corporations.15 This is also the case in South Africa where the 
corporate tax constitutes 19 per cent of total tax receipts—twice the developed country average 
(but on par with the developing country average).16 Foreign-owned corporations constitute a large 
and growing share of the total corporate sector in developing countries (UNCTAD 2015). As 
shown in Figure 2, equity earnings of foreign-owned corporations operating in South Africa 
increased steadily up until 1982. International sanctions, internal turmoil, and global boycotts 
reversed this trend and the activity of foreign-owned corporations had plummeted to 
US$0.5 billion by the end of Apartheid in 1994. Since then an explosion of foreign activity has 
taken place in South Africa and in 2014 the equity earnings of foreign corporations reached US$8.6 
billion. As a share of GDP, the earnings of foreign-owned corporations doubled in the last 25 
years. How large this share would have been absent profit shifting is the question that this paper 
addresses. 
This combination of fiscal constraints, high reliance on corporate tax receipts, and a growing 
exposure to foreign-owned firms makes the issue of profit shifting particularly relevant in South 
Africa. The corporate tax rate in South Africa has been 28 per cent since 2008, which is 4 
percentage points above the world average and 13 percentage points above nearby tax haven 
                                                 
13 This relates to the broad literature on fiscal/state capacity. See e.g. Besley and Persson (2013), Mascagni et al. (2014), 
and Kleven et al. (2016) for a discussion of tax collection constraints in developing countries. 
14 See National Treasury (2016) and OECD (2016). 
15 Currently, corporate income tax constitutes 21 per cent of the total tax income in developing countries, compared 
to 11 per cent in developed countries (UNCTAD 2015). 
16 See UNCTAD (2015). 
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Mauritius—meaning that the incentive for firms to shift profits out of South Africa is certainly 
there. 
Figure 2: Equity earnings of foreign-owned corporations in South Africa (US$ Bn.) 
 
Note: The graph shows the dividend payments and retained earnings paid by foreign-owned corporations (where 
the share of directly owned equity entitles such corporations to 10 per cent or more of the voting power) operating 
in South Africa.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IMF (n.d.). 
3 Data 
We use tax administrative data from the South African Revenue Service.17 Specifically, we have 
access to the universe of foreign-owned firms’ tax returns in South Africa from 2010 to 2014. 
These data are collected by the South African Revenue Service annually. Tax returns include 
information on key financial items such as labour costs, fixed capital, turnover, and accounting 
profits. Unsurprisingly, tax returns also provide information on the actual taxable profits of firms, 
which is not covered in the frequently used ORBIS database and may be substantially different 
due to special tax credits and other book-tax differences. This is important, as taxable profits, not 
accounting profits, is what is relevant when studying profit shifting, which is why OECD (2015a) 
promotes the use of tax-administrative data. All reporting items used in this paper are compulsory. 
Firms not complying face potential audits and resulting fines. The level of detail and (full) coverage 
of these data are unlike any that have been used to study profit shifting in developing countries.  
From May 2013 onwards, firms operating in South Africa have been required to indicate whether 
they are owned by a foreign parent (defined as an ownership stake above 70 per cent), and, if so, 
where this parent is located. Hence, this analysis focuses on foreign-owned firms operating in 
South Africa. The available data do not allow us to identify the location of foreign affiliates of 
                                                 
17 For an in-depth description of the dataset, see Kreuser and Newman (2018). 
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firms operating in South Africa that are not the immediate parent.18 We are thus only able to 
estimate profit shifting facilitated through the immediate parent firm, and any profit shifting via 
sister firms and from a South African parent to a foreign subsidiary is disregarded. This implies 
that our estimate of profit shifting out of South Africa will be a lower bound, ceteris paribus. Even 
so, the parent firms have both theoretically and empirically been proven to be a key factor in the 
profit-shifting decisions of MNEs (see e.g. Dischinger et al. 2013). It is common in the empirical 
literature that only the tax incentives of shifting between parents and subsidiaries are taken into 
account (see e.g. UNCTAD 2015 or Dharmapala and Riedel 2013).  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the foreign-owned firms in South Africa in 2014. Even 
though there are only little more than 2,000 foreign-owned firms in South Africa compared to the 
1.2 million corporations operating in South Africa, these foreign-owned companies are very large 
compared to the domestic companies. In fact, foreign-owned firms account for more than 30 per 
cent of total sales of all companies operating in South Africa.  
For most of the analysis in the paper, we use a simple profit-shifting incentive measure that is 
whether the parent is located in a tax haven as defined by Hines (2010).19 However, all results are 
replicated using the statutory corporate tax rate of the parent taken from the KPMG Corporate 
Tax Tables (KPMG n.d.). As seen in Table 1, roughly one-fifth of the foreign-owned firms are 
owned directly through a tax haven. Measured at the average, the foreign affiliates of parents 
located in tax havens have similar fixed assets, wage bills, and sales—but far lower taxable income. 
We are unable to track ownership links back in time and thus make the implicit assumption that 
ownership structures did not change from 2010 to 2014. This measurement error implies that a 
firm that is owned through a tax haven in 2014, but was not in 2013, will be falsely identified as 
having a tax haven linkage in 2013. This implies that our ownership variable has a measurement 
error, which will create an attenuation bias that should lead us to underestimate profit shifting. 
However, the South African tax specialists we discussed this with have the impression that firm 
ownership is constant over time; implying that this attenuation bias should be moderate.  
 
                                                 
18 Discussion with tax advisers does suggest that some companies may fill this information in if at least a 50 per cent 
ownership stake is met. 
19 Following Hines (2010): Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain (The Kingdom of), 
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guernsey, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, 
San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, Tonga, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, and Virgin Islands (British) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on foreign-owned firms in South Africa (2014) 
Firms owned by parent in a tax haven   Firms owned by a foreign parent not in a tax haven 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Absolute values (Million Rand)   Absolute values (Million Rand) 
Taxable profits 375 9.0 59.4 -387.0 592.0   Taxable profits 1,744 53.7 614.0 -2,800.0 21,700.0 
Sales 373 290.0 699.0 0.0 5,910.0   Sales 1,717 363.0 808.0 0.0 6,720.0 
Fixed capital 371 67.9 219.0 0.0 2,380.0   Fixed capital 1,720 52.9 212.0 0.0 2,390.0 
Labour costs 375 51.5 149.0 0.0 1,490.0   Labour costs 1,744 66.4 327.0 0.0 11,400.0 
Log values   Log values 
Taxable profits 234 15.6 2.1 3.5 20.2   Taxable profits 1,225 16.2 1.9 5.9 23.8 
Fixed capital 365 16.2 1.9 10.2 21.1   Fixed capital 1,726 16.4 1.7 10.2 21.0 
Labour costs 332 15.7 2.6 8.4 21.9   Labour costs 1,581 15.4 2.4 8.3 22.2 
Profitability measures   Profitability measures 
Profits/Sales 303 0.00 0.30 -2.17 0.73   Profits/Sales 1,507 0.01 0.31 -4.28 0.82 
Profits/Fixed assets 329 3.13 26.08 
-
139.57 189.23   Profits/Fixed assets 1,558 6.94 33.28 -174.80 493.30 
Profits/Wage bill 364 -0.24 7.55 -82.05 41.89   Profits/Wage bill 1,715 0.39 5.60 -63.44 42.19 
Misc.   Misc. 
Parent statutory tax rate 421 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.35   
Parent statutory tax 
rate 1,962 0.31 0.07 0.10 0.55 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Hines (2010), SARS (n.d.), and KPMG (n.d.). 
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4 Theoretical motivation of why size may matter  
In this section, we motivate why firm size may impact profit shifting. We show how the existence 
of fixed costs in tax planning will imply that larger firms shift a larger share of their profits to tax 
havens. As we will see, the later empirical findings support this theory. 
Imagine a multinational firm with a subsidiary in a high tax country with tax rate t and a parent in 
a tax haven with no corporate tax. Let π be the ‘true profits’ of the subsidiary and S denote the 
amount shifted to the tax haven. Then, each dollar of profits the subsidiary manages to artificially 
shift to its parent will yield a tax saving of t up until the point where there are no profits left in the 
subsidiary (S= π). Assuming that the firm seeks to maximize global profits and there are no costs 
involved, the subsidiary would shift all of its income to the parent in the tax haven (S= π) and 
obtain a tax saving of t⋅π. However, there are costs involved with shifting profits, such as soliciting 
legal advice,20 damaged public relations,21 and potential efficiency loses.22 If we assume that the 
multinational firm aims at maximizing global after-tax profits, the firm should shift income to the 
tax haven up until the point where the marginal costs of shifting equals the marginal tax saving. 
The profit shifting of each firm and its relation to firm size thus depends crucially on functional 
form of the cost function.  
There is no rigorous analysis nor understanding of the shape of the cost function firms face when 
artificially shifting income. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) argue that the marginal costs of shifting 
will be proportional to the share of true income shifted (S/π). In this case the share of profits 
shifted to tax havens will not be impacted by the size of the firm.23 Contrary to this, Davies et al 
(2018) and Johannesen et al. (2017) argue that there may be fixed costs connected to profit shifting. 
Intuitively, it seems realistic that there would be fixed costs of hiring a team of tax specialists with 
the intent to e.g. strategically manipulate transfer prices24 or create artificial royalty income flows25 
with the intent to shift profits. A small accounting literature does find descriptive evidence of a 
                                                 
20 A company engaging in profit shifting is likely to pay for legal advice and face the probability of legal consequences 
(which may require legal defence costs). These legal costs are, to a large degree, country-specific; that is, tax authorities 
and governments are able to increase the legal costs of profit shifting by enacting effective anti-profit-shifting 
legislation and by distributing resources to enforce this legislation. 
21 Anecdotal interviews with managers indicate that these costs are significant enough for managers to include them 
in their decision making.21 
22 Nielsen et al. (2008) describe how transfer mispricing strategies imply that low-level managers within the MNEs 
lose the ability to evaluate the true cost and value of internal transactions. Huizinga et al. (2008) describe how using 
increased cash flows to subsidiaries may create moral hazard implications at the subsidiary level. 
23 Denote the cost function C (
S
π
) then the optimal share of shifted profits will be independent of 𝜋. To see this, note 
that in an internal optimum the marginal costs should yield the marginal tax saving C' (
S
π
) =t => C'-1(t)= 
S
π
 
24 As documented e.g. by Clausing (2003), Cristea and Nguyen (2016), Davies et al. (2018), Hebous and Johannesen 
(2017) or Wier (2018). 
25 Most famously, the ‘Double-Dutch-Irish’ exemplifies this (see e.g. Ting 2014). 
10 
relationship between firm size and tax planning that supports the notion of fixed tax-planning 
costs.26  
 If we assume a fixed cost must be incurred in order to shift profits then the size of profits, the 
amount that can be shifted, will be a key determinant in the shifting strategies of firms. Say that at 
a fixed cost F a firm can shift a fixed share of profits φ to the parent to obtain total tax savings of 
t⋅S= t⋅π⋅φ. The firm will only enter into this tax scheme if the tax savings are larger than the fixed 
cost (t⋅π⋅φ > F). In this case size matters: small firms (with small π) will not enter into the tax 
scheme as the absolute tax savings do not outweigh the costs, while large firms (with large π) will. 
This finding is, for most people, common sense, and it is often just assumed in the public debate 
that the most aggressive profit shifters are also the largest firms (Jones 2015a). Nevertheless, the 
impact of firm size on profit shifting has not been rigorously studied before. This simple example 
motivates an empirical strategy that allows larger firms to have larger responses to tax incentives. 
As we will see, larger firms do in fact shift a larger share of profits to tax havens, which is consistent 
with the existence of fixed costs in tax planning. 
5 What the raw data tell us about size 
We begin by exploring the data in a simple visual exercise. Taking the sample of foreign-owned 
corporations, we divide them into fifty groups based on wage bill. Within these size groups we 
then compare foreign firms owned by parents located in tax havens (haven-owned) to firms owned 
by foreign parents that are not located in a tax haven (non-haven-owned). Starting from the input 
side, Figure 3a shows how the average wage bill of haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms is 
nearly identical within these fifty size groups. This is not surprising as the deciles were constructed 
using wage bills. Noisier are the average fixed asset discrepancies in Figure 3b, with a slight 
tendency of haven-owned firms to have more fixed assets. Nonetheless, within deciles, fixed assets 
are fairly similar across haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms. If anything, the haven-owned 
firms have slightly higher economic activity, suggesting that these firms should also report higher 
profits. 
Moving to the reported economic output of firms, Figure 3c averages turnover across wage bill 
deciles. This measure of activity is partly endogenous to profit shifting as firms shifting income 
out of South Africa could price exports going to affiliates in tax havens too low and/or ensure 
that sales by the South African affiliate to third parties are redirected through the tax haven. We 
do see there is a slight tendency of haven-owned firms to report lower sales (consistent with profit 
shifting). Nonetheless, haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms seem similar across size groups 
in terms of sales.  
To summarize, we see similar wage bills, fixed assets, and turnover of haven-owned and non-
haven-owned firms across size groups. It is hence striking to see the stark differences in taxable 
profits in Figure 3d. For example, among the largest 2 per cent of firms, the haven-owned firms 
had 6 per cent higher wage bills, 6 per cent higher turnover, and 22 per cent more fixed assets, but 
72 per cent lower taxable profits. This implies that a haven-owned firm in the top two percentiles 
will be earning 740 million Rand (~US$70 million) less than a non-haven-owned firm in the same 
top two percentiles. In Figure 4 the absolute differences in taxable profits are shown within each 
                                                 
26 Most notably, Mills at al. (1998) use a confidential survey of 365 US firms (conducted by Slemrod and Blumenthal 
1996) and establish that costs of tax planning pr. tax benefit decrease by firm size. Similarly, Wilson (2009) finds, based 
on news articles, that the likelihood of aggressive tax planning increases by firm size.  
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size group. The immediate insight here (as in Figure 3d) is the sheer difference in magnitude across 
size groups—the gap among the largest 4 per cent of firms is orders of magnitude larger than what 
is seen in any of the other percentiles. As also shown in Figure 4, this gap remains after removing 
industry-specific effects. 
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Figure 3: Discrepancies between economic activity and profits across size groups 
Figure 3a: Average wage bill by size and parent origin Figure 3b: Average fixed assets by size and parent origin 
  
Figure 3c: Average turnover by size and parent origin Figure 3d: Average taxable profits by size and parent origin 
  
Note: This figure shows descriptive statistics on foreign-owned firms operating in Sout Africa. Deciles are constructed based on wage bills such that 0–2% includes the 
smallest 2 per cent of firms while deciles 98–100% include the largest 2 per cent of firms. Within these deciles, firms are divided according to the location of the parent firm. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
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Figure 4: Average difference in reported income of haven vs. non-haven-owned firms 
 
 
Note: This graphs shows the contribution of each decile to the overall average earnings discrepancy between 
haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
6 Disentangling the macro perspective  
Past macro studies of profit shifting have documented how the profitability of foreign-owned 
firms across countries is impacted by the tax incentive to shift profits (see e.g. Hines and Rice 
1994; Zucman 2014; UNCTAD 2015; Clausing 2016; Tørsløv et al. 2018). These studies can 
ultimately only estimate the aggregate amount of profits shifted but are unable to determine which 
foreign-owned firms are driving the macro estimates. The South African micro data allow us to 
open the black box of macro studies and disentangle which firms are driving these estimates. We 
do this by adding up the micro data, replicating past macro findings, and then decomposing the 
macro estimate using the micro data. 
In Figure 5 we add up the South African tax returns of foreign-owned subsidiaries to calculate the 
macro profitability across firm ownership. In Figure 5a we see how profits per wage paid are 85 
per cent in foreign-owned firms if the parent is not located in a tax haven. Contrary to this, Figure 
5a also shows that the profits per wage paid are only 19 per cent in firms owned by a parent located 
in a tax haven. That is, subsidiaries of tax haven-owned firms are roughly 80 per cent less profitable 
than their non-haven-owned counterparts. This finding is corroborated when looking at taxable 
income per fixed assets in Figure 5b. Taken at face value, this suggests that 80 per cent of the 
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income of haven-owned subsidiaries is lost to tax havens. This kind of macro statistic underlies 
past macro studies on profit shifting and the estimate is comparable to previous studies.27  
Using the micro data, we can now calculate the contribution of each firm to this macro-profitability 
gap: 
Δπi=85%⋅Li-πi 
Where Δπi is the contribution of each firm to the macro-profitability gap, 85 per cent is the overall 
ratio of profits to wages paid in non-haven-owned firms, Li is the wage bill, and πi is the reported 
taxable income. This exercise allows us to understand which firms drive previous macro estimates 
of profit shifting. Secondly, if one believes the macro estimate, it gives us a heroic estimate of the 
profits shifted at the firm level.28 
In Figures 6a and 6b we rank the haven-owned firms according to their contribution to the macro-
profitability gap and plot the cumulative contribution as a share of the total profitability-gap. There 
are several important insights from this graph. Firstly, underperformance is widespread among 
haven-owned firms: more than 80 per cent of haven-owned firms contribute positively to the 
profitability gap between haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms. This implies that more than 
80 per cent of haven-owned firms are less profitable than the average non-haven-owned firm. 
Secondly, the bulk of the aggregate profitability gap is driven by very few firms: ten firms drive 50 
per cent of the aggregate profitability gap.
                                                 
27 UNCTAD (2015) use foreign direct investment (FDI) flow and stock statistics to estimate the impact of haven 
ownership on the return on assets. In developing countries they find that if the FDI stock was 100 per cent owned 
through tax havens, return on FDI assets would fall by 11–16 percentage points. In South Africa, the return on assets 
in haven-owned firms is 3 per cent. According to UNCTAD (2015) the return on assets of these affiliates would have 
been 14-19% (3%+11–16%) => 70–80% of haven-owned firms’ tax base shifted out of South Africa. 
28 Interpreting the firm-specific contributions to the profitability gap as profit shifting will of course be bound with 
uncertainty, but it does have some theoretical backing. We are simply using the standard theoretical insight that the 
wage share should be constant in an economy with perfect competition and a Cobb–Douglass production function: 
If production is given by AiKi
αLi
1-α and capital inputs are paid their marginal value, then the wage share 
w⋅L
K⋅r
=1-α will 
only depend on the elasticity of production with respect to labour and not be impacted by firm-specific technology 
Ai , capital K𝑖 , or labour inputs Li. It should be noted that, as in many countries, the notion of perfect competition in 
South Africa is not entirely true, as many industries are highly concentrated. 
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Figure 5: Profitability of foreign-owned subsidiaries in South Africa 
  Figure 5a: Taxable income (% of wage bill)   Figure 5b: Taxable income (% of fixed assets) 
  
  
 
Note: The figure shows the aggregate profitability gap between haven-owned and non-haven-owned subsidiaries. Profitability is calculated by taking the sum of taxable 
income and dividing by the sum of wages paid/fixed assets. Tax havens are defined using the list put forward by Hines (2010). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
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Figure 6: Disentangling the macro-profitability gap 
  Figure 6a: Cumulative share of estimated tax loss across firms 
 
 
  Figure 6b: Cumulative share of estimated tax loss across firms (top 5% of contributors) 
 
Note: This figure shows the contribution of haven-owned firms to the overall (macro) profitability gap between 
haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms. The haven-owned firms are ranked according to their absolute 
contribution measured as Δπi=85%⋅Li-πi, where πi denotes taxable income, Li the wage bill, and 85 per cent is 
the average profitability of non-haven-owned foreign firms. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
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Apart from a sizable wage bill, there are clear characteristics attached to the firms driving the gap. 
The first is industry; 28 per cent of the macro-profitability gap is driven by companies operating 
in the resource extractive industry, despite these firms only constituting 2 per cent of foreign-
owned firms. This is alarming given the large share of total economic activity resource extraction 
constitutes in developing countries.29 Next to resource extraction is the financial industry, 
accounting for 19 per cent of the total profit gap. 
A final way to examine the profitability gap is by parent location. In Figure 7 we divide firms based 
on parent location and compare the reported taxable income (the red bars) to the income they 
would have reported if they had the same profitability as the non-haven-owned firms (85 per cent 
of the wage bill—the blue bars). The aggregate gap between the red and blue bars adds up to the 
total profit gap between haven and non-haven-owned firms. From Figure 7 it is clear that, without 
exception, all tax haven owners are underperforming compared to the non-haven owners, on 
average. It is striking that there are many haven owners that report near zero or negative profits in 
South Africa despite having large wage bills. These havens include Bermuda, the British Crown 
Dependencies, Liechtenstein, Cayman Islands, Mauritius, Singapore, and Cyprus. However, what 
is immediately clear is that, in terms of magnitude, Switzerland is the main contributor—50 per 
cent of the profit gap between haven-owned and non-haven-owned firms is due to Swiss-owned 
firms. This may not come as a surprise in the light of recent anecdotal evidence of the active role 
of Swiss subsidiaries in Africa.30 
Repeating this exercise using profitability measured as taxable profits over fixed assets does not 
change these findings. There are, however, huge caveats to this simple analysis of firm profitability. 
First, we would want to allow industry-specific deviations in profitability. Second, production 
inputs should be taken into account simultaneously. Finally, the return on the production inputs 
(determined by production elasticities and bargaining power) of large and small firms should be 
allowed to differ. The next natural step is thus to move to a regression analysis.   
  
                                                 
29 Total natural resources rents (percentage of GDP) are three times the developed country average in South Africa 
and other middle-income countries, and twelve times as high in low-income countries (World Bank 2013).  
30 See e.g. Jones (2015b) or ActionAid (2012, 2015).  
 18 
Figure 7: Predicted vs. actual profits in haven-owned firms  
 
Note: This figure shows the discrepancy in reported taxable income and the predicted income across tax haven-
owned firms. Normal profitability is defined as having a taxable income of 85% of the wage bill paid (which is the 
average among non-haven-owned firms). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
7 What regressions hide 
We employ the standard identification strategy introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) and since 
exploited in more than 30 academic papers,31 which is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
of the form: 
log(πit) =β1 log(Kit) +β2 log( Lit )+β3Parent in haveni+αnt+ϵi (1) 
Where the unit of observation is at the firm-year level, i denotes the firm, and t denotes the period. 
πit is the taxable income of the firm, Ki denotes the fixed assets, and αnt are industry-year fixed 
effects. Parent in haveni is a dummy variable taking the value one if the parent is located in a tax 
haven as defined by Hines (2010).32 Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
                                                 
31 See de Mooiji and Ederveen (2008), Dharmapala (2014), or Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) for a review of this 
literature. 
32 Following Hines (2010): Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, (The Kingdom of), 
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guernsey, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, 
San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, Tonga, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, and Virgin Islands (British) 
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The identifying assumption is that if there is no profit shifting, and conditional on production 
inputs, the location of the parent will have no (systematic) impact on profitability and β
3
 should 
hence be zero. However, if β
3
<0 this means that firms owned by a tax haven are systematically 
underperforming and indicates that firms with a parent in a tax haven are shifting profits out of 
South Africa. One crucial caveat is that we cannot observe foreign affiliates in tax havens other 
than the parent firm. If firms without a parent in a tax haven are shifting profits to sister companies 
in tax havens (i.e. non-parent affiliates), this lowers the control group profitability and creates a 
downward bias in our estimate. Our results should hence be seen as a lower bound estimate of 
profit shifting to parents in tax havens. 
Across the full sample we find that the haven dummy coefficient is -34.6 per cent and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level.  This implies the average firm with a parent in a tax haven will be 
associated with approximately -34.6 per cent lower taxable profits. However, this average across 
firms conceals large and systematic deviations across firm size. We extend the analysis by dividing 
the sample into ten groups according to wage bills and run the regression within these groups. In 
Figure 8 the coefficient of each of these ten regressions is plotted with a filled marker indicating 
significance at the 10 per cent level. Notably, there is no statistically, nor economically significant, 
association between haven ownership and profitability in the bottom 50 per cent (deciles one to 
five). On the contrary, the estimated haven coefficient is below -40 per cent and statistically 
significant in four out of five of the top deciles. Among the 10 per cent largest firms, a haven 
affiliation is associated with nearly 80 per cent lower taxable income.  
In terms of the actual tax base, the 10 per cent largest foreign subsidiaries (measured according to 
wage bill) earn 80 per cent of the income accruing to foreign-owned companies. The profit shifting 
of these firms is hence more informative about total profit shifting than the responses of all other 
firms combined. Subsequently, failing to account for the more aggressive profit shifting of larger 
firms will dramatically underestimate total profit shifting. More philosophically, the firm is to some 
extent an arbitrary level of observation and hence the average firm is a somewhat arbitrary statistic. 
If two firms merge, are they then half as relevant? Do we care as much about a one-man firm as 
we do about a firm employing 1,000 employees? As an alternative to the unweighted average, we 
re-estimate Equation 1 in a weighted regression using wage bill as the weight. The estimated 
coefficient is -58 per cent or almost twice the unweighted estimate.  
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Figure 8: Impact of having a parent in a tax haven across size deciles  
 
 
Note: This figure shows the differential impact of having a parent in a tax haven. Size deciles are comstructed 
using wage bill; 0–10% being the smallest 10 per cent of firms and 90–100% being the largest 10 per cent. The 
OLS model log(πit) =β1 log(Kit) +β2 log( Lit )+β3Parent in haveni+αnt+ϵi is estimated within deciles and β3 plotted. 
An empty marker indicates statistical insignificance. The blue line shows the unweighted average estimate of β
3
. 
The green line shows the wage bill weighted estimate of β
3
 . Full regression results are available in the online 
appendix. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SARS (n.d.). 
The size heterogeneities in profit-shifting responses are very impactful on the overall tax loss 
estimates. The estimated tax loss (in absolute values) is eight times higher where β
3
=80% compared 
to  β
3
=33%. 33 When adding to this that 80 per cent of the current tax base of foreign-owned firms 
is reported in the top decile, the total loss estimate changes dramatically when allowing tax 
responses to differ across deciles. 
In Figure 9 we plot the estimated cumulative tax loss as a share of the current tax payments of the 
haven-owned firms. The inflexible (standard specification) estimate is an aggregate tax loss of 
53 per cent of the current tax base, while the flexible specification estimate is an aggregate tax loss 
of 286 per cent (i.e. the tax base of haven-owned firms would increase by 286 per cent absent 
profit shifting). That is, the dollar value of the estimated tax loss increases six-fold when properly 
accounting for firm size (286 per cent divided by 53 per cent). Notably, 98 per cent of the tax loss 
is driven by the top decile.  
                                                 
33 To see this, note that 
Tax loss
Current tax revenue
= (
1
1-β
3
-1) , which is 400 per cent in the case of β
3
=80% and 50 per cent in the 
case of β
3
=33%. 
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We perform a series of robustness checks. First, we define the deciles by turnover instead of wage 
bill, which does not impact the results. Second, using the re-weighting procedure by DiNardo et 
al. (1996) and Boserup et al. (2016), we match observations based on wage bills and then estimate 
the model on the matched sample. Again, this does not change the results. Third, instead of relying 
on a binary measure of whether the parent is in a tax haven, we use the statutory tax rate of the 
parent country. This also does not impact the results. Finally, as discussed in Johannesen et al. 
(2017), a logarithmic specification has the limitation of censoring zero or negative values of taxable 
income. Hence, we re-estimate the model using a hyperbolic sine transformation, which increases 
the response to tax incentives at all deciles but does not change the qualitative results.  
Figure 9: Estimated tax loss (% of current tax payments in haven-owned firms) 
 
Note: This figure shows the implications for revenue loss estimate when allowing for differential effects across 
firm size. Size deciles are constructed using wage bills; 1 being the smallest 10 per cent of firms and 10 being the 
largest 10 per cent. In the flexible specification, the OLS model 
log(πit) =β1 log(Kit) +β2 log( Lit )+β3Parent in haveni+αnt+ϵi  is estimated within deciles and the tax loss of each 
decile is computed using the formula: current tax base of haven-owned firms⋅ (
1
1-β3
-1). In the inflexible 
specification, 𝛽3 is estimated across the entire sample and not allowed to vary. Full regression results are 
available in the online appendix. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
8 Beyond South Africa: revisiting the OECD BEPS estimate 
South Africa might be a special case. To test the external validity of our results, it is necessary to 
test how heterogeneity in profit shifting across firm sizes may look in other settings. 
In the G20-mandated BEPS report, the OECD engages in an ambitious attempt to estimate the 
global tax loss caused by profit shifting. The underlying methodology is to relate the profitability 
of MNE entities to a profit-shifting incentive. Concretely, the estimated model takes the form: 
 
Profitsi
Total Assetsi
=αX+β1 (τi-
Στk
N
) +ϵi (2) 
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Where X is a vector of country, industry, and firm controls; 𝜏𝑖 is the corporate tax rate of the entity 
in scope; and 
Στk
N
 is the average tax rate facing the MNE group as a whole.  β
1
 is the coefficient of 
interest, which shows the impact of being a relatively highly taxed subsidiary in the MNE group. 
If profit shifting occurs β
1
< 0 as we anticipate high tax subsidiaries τi>
Στk
N
 to shift profits to low-
tax affiliates.  
As an illustration of the impact of size outside of South Africa, we revisit the OECD BEPS 
estimate. Concretely, we estimate Equation 2 on the global sample of MNE subsidiaries in ORBIS 
in 2010. Following the approach set out in this paper, we then re-estimate the model within size 
groups. That is, we divide the sample into twenty size bins based on total assets and estimate the 
model within each bin. In Figure 10a the estimated coefficients are plotted with a filled marker 
indicating significance. The unweighted average effect of the tax differential is -7.1 per cent, which 
implies that a one percentage point increase in the tax differential will imply a 7.1 percentage point 
drop in profits per assets. However, this unweighted average effect conceals large differences 
across firm size. In the bottom 35 per cent of MNE subsidiaries there is essentially no estimated 
impact of the tax differential, and it is these subsidiaries that drag down the overall unweighted 
effect. ORBIS coverage is particularly poor in small companies, which may explain the difference 
to the South African case, in which we saw a zero response to tax haven affiliation in the bottom 
50 per cent of firms. The estimated impact in the top 5 per cent largest subsidiaries is -10.9 per 
cent. All in all, the South African phenomenon of stronger profit shifting responses in larger firms 
seems to go beyond South Africa. 
As the attentive reader will notice, the slope of the size curve in Figure 10a is flatter than what we 
saw in the South African data in Figure 8. However, ORBIS accounts for less than 17 per cent of 
multinationals’ global profits (Tørsløv et al. 2018), and there is good reason to believe coverage is 
particularly poor in the smallest of firms. If ORBIS data are left-censored the size curve might very 
well be the same globally as it is in South Afrcia.34 More importantly, the fact that ORBIS coverage 
is not universal (or representative), combined with systematic differences in firm responses across 
size, warrants caution when interpreting the estimated average elasticities estimated using ORBIS.35 
  
                                                 
34 We can add to this that some of the world’s very largest subsidiaries in tax havens (and presumably most actively 
profit shifting) are systematically absent in ORBIS, which again flattens the size curve. See Tørsløv et al. (2018).  
35 Other concerns about using the ORBIS database are discussed in the Introduction, OECD (2015a: 32–37), and 
Tørsløv et al. (2018). 
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Figure 10: Revisiting the OECD profit shifting estimate 
Figure 10a: Heterogeneity in OECD estimate across entity size 
 
  Figure 10b: Heterogeneity in OECD estimate across MNE group size 
 
Note: This figure revisits the OECD BEPS report estimate of profit shifting. Each marker indicates the estimate of 
β
1
 obtained from fitting the OLS model 
Profitsi
Total Assetsi
=αX+β
1
(τi-
Στk
N
) +ϵi. Size deciles are constructed using total 
assets and the model is then estimated within size groups. A filled marker indicates statistical significance. The 
grey line shows the unweighted average estimate of β
1
. The red line shows the wage bill weighted estimate of β
1
. 
Full regression results are available in the online appendix. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SARS (n.d.). 
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In the simple model presented in this paper, the size of the subsidiary was the only determinant of 
profit shifting. However, in reality, we might suspect that the size of the multinational group as a 
whole is a more relevant driver of profit shifting. If a multinational group is very large, the parent 
can then put in costly efforts to shift intellectual property to tax havens and later reap the tax 
benefit of having all subsidiaries shift income to the tax haven.36 The decision of the parent in this 
case depends on the overall size of the group, not the size of the entity. Contrary to the South 
African data, ORBIS has (some) information on the entire multinational group, which allows us 
to rank the firms according to the total assets in the entire group. In Figure 10b we compare the 
estimated profit-shifting response across group size deciles. We indeed find that the size curve is 
much steeper, which indicates that group size is a more potent driver of profit shifting than entity 
size. In the largest 20 per cent of multinational groups (measured according to total assets), the 
estimated profit shifting response ranges from -9.7 per cent to -26.3 per cent, which is between 36 
per cent and 370 per cent larger than the unweighted mean (of -7.1 per cent). 
9 Conclusion and questions for future research 
In this paper, we examine how estimated profit-shifting responses differ across firm size. 
Remarkably, we show how a standard estimation procedure will lead to zero or marginal effects 
among the bottom 50 per cent of firms. However, the estimated responses increase with size and 
are substantial at the top of the size distribution. As the bulk of the corporate tax base is at the 
very top, this implies that profit-shifting responses estimated at the mean are substantially smaller 
than the actual aggregate response. In the South African case, the estimated tax loss increases by 
600 per cent when properly accounting for firm size, and as much as 98 per cent of this tax loss is 
caused by firms operating in the top decile. This finding is not unique to South Africa—we revisit 
the OECD official estimate of profit shifting and again find that profit-shifting responses are 
largest in the largest firms, which is why an unweighted average effect will underestimate tax losses. 
We show how these findings can fully explain the observed gap between micro and macro 
estimates of profit shifting which have puzzled both academics and policy makers (see e.g. Beer et 
al. 2018). 
Inequality in profit shifting as documented in this paper shows how profit shifting creates 
competitive distortions by granting an uneven tax benefit to the largest of firms. Additionally, the 
fact that the largest firms benefit disproportionally more may simply seem unfair.   
A number of questions are left unanswered in this study. First, it remains to be tested whether 
these findings are robust using a more causal identification strategy, e.g. in an event study design 
(such as Dharmapala and Riedel 2013; Johannesen and Larsen 2016; Johannesen et al. 2017). The 
short time span of the subsidiary panel in South Africa unfortunately did not allow any testing of 
this. Second, a question for further research is whether the inequality of profit shifting differs 
across countries. To test this rigorously, tax administrative data of other countries would need to 
be accessed, as low-coverage databases such as ORBIS will not include the full firm distribution. 
Third, the South African firm data do not allow us to study profit shifting to sister firms (foreign 
affiliates other than the parent) or from South African parents to foreign subsidiaries, and further 
studies of this are required to understand the full picture. Finally, a larger question for further 
research is what mechanisms drive the observed link between firm size and profit shifting. 
                                                 
36 See e.g. Zucman (2014) for examples of this. 
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